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This paper demonstrates the use of network analysis 
to identify core nodes associated with ransomware 
attacks in cryptocurrency transaction networks. The 
method helps trace the cyber entities involved in 
cryptocurrency attacks and supports intelligence efforts 
to identify and disrupt cryptocurrency networks. 
A data corpus is built by the unsupervised machine 
learning graph algorithm ‘DeepWalk’ [1]. DeepWalk 
evaluates the position of nodes within networks.  It 
compares the relative position of different nodes 
(similarity) and identifies those whose removal would 
most affect the network (riskiness).  This method helps 
identify on the blockchain the key nodes that are 
involved in the execution of a ransomware attack.  
When applied to the ransomware “cash out” graph, 
the method derived “riskiness” scores for specific 
nodes.  Analysing the derived “riskiness” at a 
community level (groups of nodes in the network) 
provides an enhanced granularity for identifying and 
targeting influential nodes.  Such insight could 
potentially support both intelligence and forensics 
investigations.   
1. Introduction  
In 2019 over US$6.6 million was paid globally to 
cryptocurrency addresses related to ransomware, 
according to the 2020 Crypto Crime Report from 
blockchain analysis company Chainalysis [2]. This is 
emphasised by the fact that the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission (US SEC) has seen over 
1,000 documents submitted by companies between 
April 2019 and May 2020 that list ransomware as a 
critical risk factor to their businesses [3]. Companies 
face multi-million dollar outages such as those faced by 
the city of New Orleans in 2019. The city’s Chief 
Administrative Officer, Gilbert Montaño, indicated that 
the ransomware attack will cost the city at least US$7 
million [4]. There are plenty of opportunities for cyber 
criminals to cash out their booty. One of the most 
popular ways for ransomware attackers to do so between 
2013 and 2016 was through the Russian based BTC-e 
exchange [2].  
Identifying the magnitude and location of illicit 
funds throughout the blockchain is no easy endeavour, 
the cryptocurrency investigation companies Elliptic and 
Chainalysis provide their own powerful proprietary 
software platforms to do this. However, there are some 
open-source tools and techniques that allow us to 
analyse this evolving threat to confront ransomware 
attacks. 
Throughout this paper, network and graph will be 
used interchangeably as we explore the utility of graph 
analysis for cyber financial crime prevention. Out of the 
hundreds of thousands of Bitcoin transactions on a 
blockchain, the first challenge is to isolate the relevant 
Bitcoin nodes used in a ransomware attack. We will 
further show how graph analysis reveals patterns and 
provides the capability to expose nefarious relationships 
between the Bitcoin transactions and addresses in the 
ransomware-Bitcoin network. In addition, DeepWalk 
[1] embeddings provide a machine-learning technique 
for graphs that sets up feature extraction from the 
ransomware-Bitcoin cash-out network. These features 
can be used in a similarity analysis that is based on 
Cosine Similarity to identify the risk posed by the 
removal of a node from the Bitcoin-ransomware cash-
out network. We will apply the Cosine Similarity 
calculation comparing nodes with the ransomware seed 
address to isolate individuals and communities of risky 
nodes. Furthermore, our target network dataset can be 
enriched with contextual labels derived from other open 
source blockchain analysis tools setting up future 
research with more advanced machine learning 
prediction techniques. 
 






2. Fighting financial crime with graph 
analysis  
Tracing illicit flows of money through a network 
requires techniques that reveal patterns and provide the 
capability to expose nefarious relationships across vast 
amounts of data. The trails left behind by these financial 
flows provide a web of transactions interconnected by 
accounts and services to obfuscate identity on purpose 
by blending seamlessly into the economic system. In 
traditional banking, the transactions, accounts and 
services form a network and can be modelled as a graph. 
For example, De Marzi [5], uses credit card fraud as a 
case study, modelling where credit card holders make 
legitimate transactions at different services and in 
another graph showing where fraud actors with stolen 
credit card data test the stolen credit card numbers. By 
modelling this fraud scenario as a graph, it helps identify 
patterns where the credit card data may have been stolen 
or where stolen credit card data is being tested at certain 
services.  
Voutila [6] uses the PaySim mobile money network 
financial dataset originally posited by Lopez-Rojas et al 
[7]. The graph model created contains transactions, 
merchants, clients and client identifiers in order to filter 
a large set of activity and perform graph analysis, such 
as weakly connected components, to identify fraud rings 
within the larger graph. Components, nodes, in a graph 
are said to be weakly connected if they are all connected 
or reachable from any other node in the same graph. 
Galler and Fischer [8], first revealed this algorithm and 
it has been used to understand how well connected 
networks are, how clusters of activity form and how 
well the network remains connected when nodes of 
certain authority are eliminated.  
Furthermore, the case for revealing money 
laundering has an even stronger emphasis today. Anti-
Money Laundering laws, regulation and compliance 
such as, The Anti-money Laundering and Counter-
terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) in Australia [9] and 
the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive of the 
European Union [10] provide a legislative framework 
for the prevention and detection of money laundering 
and terrorism financing. However, detecting money 
laundering networks still proves extremely difficult as 
seen in the 2017 royal commission into the Australian 
banking, superannuation, and financial services 
industry, where over 200 money laundering compliance 
failures were revealed with one bank alone [11, 12]. 
Data and Analytics firm Dun and Bradstreet put this 
difficulty down to the scale and complexity of the data 
that needs to be analysed to find the nefarious 
relationships within the financial transactions. As a firm 
they are using graph technology to meet the Anti-Money 
Laundering standards previously mentioned [13].  
Whilst graph analysis has become an established 
tool for identifying and fighting financial fraud in the 
traditional economy, a question remains as to the utility 
of the method in the emerging space of 
cryptocurrencies, especially Bitcoin, which is the 
cryptocurrency of choice for most ransomware attacks 
today. Bitcoin uses Bitcoin addresses as a banking client 
would use their bank account number. Bitcoin value is 
sent and received between addresses via transactions. 
There are many Bitcoin addresses that make up a 
Bitcoin wallet. It is not uncommon for wallet users to 
create a new Bitcoin address for every new transaction 
to help preserve their anonymity [14]. The full balance 
of a Bitcoin address needs to be spent during a 
transaction and as such change addresses are often 
found, where the balance of the transaction is paid back 
to the originating Bitcoin address. Spotting irregular 
Bitcoin activity and unusual connections occurring in 
the blockchain at scale proves extremely difficult 
without the aid of graph visualization tools [14].  These 
reveal patterns and anomalies in intuitive and interactive 
ways. Therefore, the graphs derived for ransomware-
Bitcoin behaviour provide a powerful analysis 
capability which leverages the Bitcoin ecosystem to 
build the scope of the ransomware-Bitcoin target 
network. 
3. The Ransomware-Bitcoin target network 
In line with Clark and Mitchell’s target centric 
approach, we begin the intelligence process by defining 
a generic target model to guide intelligence collection 
and analysis [15]. The generic Target Network Model 
(TNM) for our ransomware-Bitcoin target network is 





Figure 1 – Ransomware - Bitcoin Target Network 
Model (‘Cash-out’) 
 
Figure 1 shows the representation of Bitcoin 
addresses and transactions at different levels of a target 
network in a model of a ransomware campaign. Due to 
the size and complexity of the overall ransomware 
campaign network the TNM is split between cash-in and 
cash-out models. Figure 1 only shows the cash-out side 
of the network.  
The cash-out network models the proceeds of crime 
as they flow from the ransomware seed address that 
victims of the ransomware attack have paid into to other 
addresses in the Bitcoin universe. These ransom 
payments ultimately exit the network where they are 
exchanged for other cryptocurrencies or even fiat 
currency. 
In order to demonstrate the method, we will collect 
data related to the cash-out network of the ransomware 
campaign, WannaCry 2.0 and populate the generic 
target model. This campaign was chosen because the 
findings from our network investigation can be 
validated against other sources. The next section will  
identify the data collection requirements and methods 
used and introduce the analysis system being applied to 
the populated TNM.  
 
4. Data Collection 
The Bitcoin blockchain contains the record of 
addresses and transactions involved in Bitcoin 
transactions. This ‘on-chain’ data along with the 
respective meta-data can be exploited. 
Figure 2 shows a data pipeline with associated 
analysis techniques that are used to exploit Bitcoin 
blockchain data. 
Step one – Extract data from the Bitcoin blockchain 
- Extract transaction history relating to the 
ransom seed address from the 
walletexplorer.com Application Programming 
Interface (API). 
- For each incoming and outgoing transaction 
from the seed address, build the input and 
output graphs respectively at ‘D’ levels deep 
away from the seed address (see Figure 1). 
Step two – Load data into graph database (Neo4j) 
- Load extracted input and output graph files 
setting input/output addresses as nodes; 
transactions as nodes; and Payments as a 
relationship between them. 
- Post process address nodes to include 
corresponding depth ‘D’ of transaction nodes. 
Step three – Transform data 
- Run the PageRank algorithm and add this as a 
property on the nodes in the network. 
- Run the DeepWalk algorithm on nodes and 
embed the results onto the nodes in the network 
Step four – Data analysis preparation 
- Run Louvain community detection algorithm 
using average in/out degree and PageRank. 
Aggregate results of communities. 
- Run community detection and return non-
aggregated results, returning all nodes in the 
Figure 2 - Ransomware-Bitcoin Graph Analysis System 
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network with the respective in/out degree, 
PageRank, DeepWalk embeddings, labels, 
depth, timestamp. Export to Comma Separated 
Values (CSV). 
- These network analysis algorithms were run 
from within the Neo4j graph database 
Step five – Data visualisation 
- Import the CSV into python script to:  
- Visualise community detection profile 
- Python was used to perform Principal 
Components Analysis (PCA) + K-means 
clustering on DeepWalk embeddings 
- Output results to CSV for deep dive analysis 
into comparing communities and clusters 
across different ransomware by using Cosine 
Similarity. 
 
The key transformation of the data we will focus on 
in this publication relates to the graph embeddings 
derived in steps three and four. The graph embeddings 
will become features for future graph machine learning 
applications. The PCA undertaken in step five is 
essential for managing the dimensionality of the 
embedding computations. It is key to the analysis to 
examine specific nodes and determine how influential 
they are within the Bitcoin-ransomware network. This 
would serve as an indicator of their relative importance 
in the transfer and circulation of ransom payments.  For 
this reason, the PageRank algorithm was chosen as an 
appropriate centrality measure for this purpose. The 
subsequent sections elaborate on the proposed 
methodology. 
 
5. Risky node analysis  
The blockchain data should yield a network of 
wallets and transactions involved in the WannaCry 
ransomware attack, but the network data on its own does 
not provide sufficient context to identify the key nodes 
that are involved in the process.  We propose to 
approximate the significance of each node in the 
network by measuring the effect the node’s removal 
would have on the viability and function of the network. 
We conceptualise this effect as risk to the network, and 
the measurement involved as a measure of riskiness. 
Using the DeepWalk graph embeddings that encode the 
structure of a graph at each node relative to its position 
in the target network (see figure 1), we can leverage 
these embeddings as features into a Cosine Similarity 
calculation which provides an index of how ‘risky’ the 
nodes are relative to the ransomware Bitcoin seed 
address. Furthermore, analysing the risky nodes 
collectively forms target communities which could 
prove more effective as opposed to targeting these nodes 
individually. 
 
5.1. Graph embeddings and features 
 
Once the TNM has been created and populated with 
the extracted data, the graph itself becomes very large 
and dense making it difficult to detect any unusual 
behaviour at face value. There needs to be a simplified 
way of preserving the graph properties like the structure 
and the features on the nodes and edges [16]. This is 
achieved by the graph embedding algorithm that 
transforms all the information learned from a graph into 
a lower dimensional vector space representation. The 
graph embedding algorithm chosen for this analysis is 
DeepWalk by Perozzi et al [1].  
DeepWalk learns structural representations of a 
graph’s nodes by capturing its similarity in a 
neighbourhood of other nodes and allocating individual 
nodes to cliques we call communities [1]. By taking a 
graph as an input to the algorithm, latent representations 
are produced as an output. These representations 
become the input to a neural network. Operating a 
neural network on a graph structure allows for deep 
feature learning of nodes and edges for a graph [17]. 
DeepWalk uses deep learning for unsupervised feature 
learning, which means, the system learns the node’s 
embeddings without any prior knowledge of the graph 
topology. Depending on what nodes are encountered 
and how often they are traversed during a random walk, 
the neural network makes a prediction about a node 
feature or classification and embeds that into the node 
as metadata. By sampling the graph via random walks, 
we build the data corpus for that graph. The data corpus 
is then used as the reference library for a node’s purpose 
within the graph. For example, in the ransomware-
Bitcoin TNM the ransomware seed address can be taken 
and its “context” predicted within the scope of the entire 
graph. This means embedding an understanding of a 
node’s features, such as, transaction amount, 
connectivity to other nodes (how many input and output 
transactions there are from a node) and structural role 
(E.g. the root node of the network or a leaf of a weakly 
connected branch). Having these embeddings encoded 
into a node provides a basis for subsequent 
generalisation through various possible means.  In this 
case, we chose the PCA and K-means clustering 
analysis (see figure 2) to reduce the dimensionality of 
the embeddings. PCA as a method of reducing large 
datasets whilst preserving as much information, or 
statistical variability, from the original data [18].  In this 
case we were able to reduce the relevant dimensionality 
from 128 down to a two-dimensional vector space. This 
two-dimensional representation of the graph 
embeddings will now be used in the next section as input 
Page 1563
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into a similarity analysis to ascertain which nodes in the 
TNM are riskier than others.  
5.2. Concept of Similarity 
 
Cosine Similarity is a measure used to identify how 
similar entities, or in this case nodes in a network, are 
irrespective of their magnitude [19]. In this case, the 
graph analysed by the DeepWalk algorithm is reduced 
to a series of variables which incorporate latent features 
of a node’s community structure as an output for use in 
calculating the similarity between the vector 
representations of these features.  
Seeing as the theory of this process has its roots in 
natural language processing, we use the analogy of 
finding meaning and context (similarity) in a text.  The 
process allows us to analyse the similarity in words’ 
meanings, while ignoring the words’ location in the text.  
The procedure we are proposing would be equivalent to 
having a graph (the document), containing many 
random walks (sentences) from each of the nodes 
(words) in the graph. Ultimately arriving at a 
meaningful similarity of a node’s context with respect 
to the other nodes in the graph. An illustration of this 




Instead of measuring the distance between two 
nodes, Cosine Similarity measures the cosine of the 
angle between them. Cosine similarity is superior to a 
simple measure of distance in identifying the common 
features of disparate nodes.  Plotting the distribution of 
the cosine similarity, box labelled 5 in figure 3, assert 
that there are close similarities between nodes not purely 
related to the latent features derived from the DeepWalk 
embeddings. By taking the cosine similarity of these 
features we are not only considering the proximity of a 
node to the ransomware seed address, rather the context 
of the node in the whole graph being analysed. This can 
be seen in figure 3, box labelled 3, where node C is in 
close proximity to the ransomware seed address X, 
however in figure 3, box labelled 5, the angle between 
C and X is larger than the angle between A and X, where 
A is more distant from the ransomware seed address in 
box labelled 3.  
 
There could be several reasons for this. The number 
of nodes directly connected to nodes C and A, or closely 
connected in the neighbourhood (two or three hops 
away). Additionally, how many times the particular 
node occurs in context to other nodes in the generated 
corpus of the entire graph relative to the ransomware 




bitcoin seed address in the network. For example, in the 
cash-out graph for WannaCry ransomware Bitcoin seed 
address, 
12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMw, in 
figure 4, a node, 
1BvTQTP5PJVCEz7dCU2YxgMskMxxikSruM, with a 
high similarity relative to the ransom seed address 
resides at a Bitcoin exchange Poloniex.com. This was 
identified as one of the cash-out exchanges used by the 
attackers in WannaCry (Bistarelli et al 2018).  
Therefore, it follows that similarity scores relative to 
the ransom seed address might usefully serve as a proxy 
measure for riskiness. The higher the similarity 
calculated for a node with respect to the ransom seed 
address, the higher the risk score for that node. For 
example, if a high-risk scoring node was removed from 
the network the attackers would be unable to cash out 
their proceeds of crime. Therefore, risk used in this 
context refers to the risk imposed on the attacker 
fulfilling the objectives of the network.  
5.4. Similarity as a measure of risk 
 
Similarity can therefore be used as a proxy for 
riskiness. Using the mathematical calculation of Cosine 
Similarity, a proxy measure for riskiness is established 
relative to the ransomware seed address. Taking the 
ransomware seed address as the most significant node  
 
on a ransomware-Bitcoin cash-out network,  (because if 
there was no seed address created, there would be no 
ransom collected), then using the graph embeddings to 
computationally calculate the similarity of every other 
node relative to this node we are able to derive a risk 
score. As a result of this analysis a similarity matrix is 
produced that can be used as a heatmap to target the 
risky nodes in the network. If another node in the 
ransomware cash-out network scores a high ‘similarity’ 
relative to the ransomware seed address, and if that 
highly scored node is removed from the network this 
node is the next critical to the network fulfilling its 
objective of cashing out the ransom collected. This 
would allow for the targeting of nodes with the high 
similarity scores and hence if we target or neutralise this 
node, it puts the network’s objectives “at risk”. For 
example, using a classification range the heatmap could 
be represented as follows: ‘Very High’ for risk scores 
ranging from 0.95 to 1, shaded in red; ‘High’ from 0.75 
to 0.95, shaded in Orange-Red; ‘Medium’ from 0.5 to 
0.75, Yellow-Orange; ‘Low’ from 0 to 0.5, Green-
Yellow. Applying this concept to the Wannacry cash-
out network produces the following results in table 1. 
 
Figure 4 - Distribution of node similarity for WannaCry Ransomware seed address 





Table 1 - Top 20 by risk score for nodes in the 




Figure 4 shows the distribution of the risk scores and 
the respective node index (address or transaction) for the 
WannaCry cash-out graph. In this figure we concentrate 
on those nodes with riskiness ranging from 0.95 to 1, 
representing the top 20% of nodes by risk score. On the 
x-axis, node riskiness is represented by a score from 0 
to 1 across the entire network dataset. Where a score 
closer to ‘0’ shows little similarity relative to the 
ransomware seed address and can be interpreted as a 
node in the network that exhibits little risk when it 
comes to facilitating the cash-out of ransom collected. 
On the other hand, those scores closer to ‘1’, show a 
similarity or closeness to the ransomware seed address. 
The actual riskiness should be viewed from both the X 
& Y measures as it is the cosine of the coordinate point 
of one node relative to the ransomware seed address 
which is always at position (1,0). Because the analysis 
is normalised the radius (or arc in this case) will not 
exceed a radius of 1 as it moves from (1,0) to (0,1). This 
calculation removes the emphasis on magnitude of the 
vectors and measures the angle between two nodes 
showing a relative importance to the network no matter 
how many levels deep in the network we move away 
from the ransomware seed address.   
The ransomware seed address, 
12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMw, sits at 
position Y=0 and X=1 on the chart and the next closest 
node 1LZ9WozeiHEQWE3JQbikGHLXa6qiKLXJjN 
represents an address that has a node riskiness of 0.9999 
(see table 1) and is therefore deemed critical to the 
movement of funds out of the ransomware seed address. 
The second most risky node with risk score = 
0.9999987018 is another Bitcoin address 
1BvTQTP5PJVCEz7dCU2YxgMskMxxikSruM. This 
is an address directly linked to the Poloniex.com 
exchange where the WannaCry attackers cashed out 
their proceeds of crime [20]. 
 
Looking into why these nodes are deemed risky in 
the context of this research, we could determine the 
Bitcoin address, 
1LZ9WozeiHEQWE3JQbikGHLXa6qiKLXJjN, to be a 
false positive in our detection system as it seems to be 
part of a bigger cluster of nodes, centred around the 
transaction (ID: 
29779df2e2a5a1f823b22e7e974a0082bdfd389edc1c11
d1d4f6b290d8118d27) contributing a small amount of 
Bitcoin (0.0034398 BTC) taking place on 31st August 
2017 at 16:32:00 UTC. Considering the WannaCry 
campaign cashed out on the 3rd August 2017 from the 
ransomware seed address [21], this has greatly exceeded 
the campaign time window and targeting this particular 
node might provide little impact on the risk of the 
network fulfilling the objectives. However, some 
forensic analysis might be warranted. This address is 
one out of 236 other addresses taking part in peeling 
activity which ultimately outputs to an address 
(1ETWkyQUY9nRpVMyGwha4vRhwKgMbomMQe) 
linked to another exchange, HitBTC.com which could 
be targeted for investigation for playing a part in 
soliciting illegal ransomware money flows (Neutrino, 
2017). As previously mentioned for the next risky node, 
1BvTQTP5PJVCEz7dCU2YxgMskMxxikSruM, it has 
a direct link to the exchange Poloniex.com. This can be 
interpreted as a true positive result from the analysis 
system shown in figure 2. Looking at the detail behind 
this address, it directly receives 17 BTC, the full amount 
of ransom collected from the WannaCry campaign on 
the 3rd August 2017 at 10:04:51 UTC. The same time a 
twitter bot known as @actual_ransom identified the first 
outflows from the WannaCry attackers’ wallets. This 
bot was set up by journalist Keith Collins to monitor 
activity of the WannaCry ransom addresses [22]. 
5.5. Risk in communities 
 
To complement the derivation of the risk score is the 
identification of additional data that has been extracted 
from the walletexplorer API and collected as part of the 
analysis system depicted in figure 2. This takes the form 
of ‘labels’, ‘PageRank’ and ‘community’. The labels 
nominate what service the node belongs to and provide 
a strong indicator for the attribution of real world 
identification into the Bitcoin ecosystem. In figure 4, we 





indicating these could be cash-out exchanges used by 
the attackers. In addition, PageRank is represented by 
the size of the bubble in figure 4 and defines node 
influence in a network based on the frequency of its 
connections to other nodes [23]. That is the larger the 
bubble in figure 4, the larger the PageRank and the 
larger the influence of the node in the network.  
 
It is interesting to observe the node position relative 
to PageRank and the risk score. The second largest page 
ranked nodes, 
1ArG3JwEbF4WrCiEnXQXUAgQumAVzqnQHD 
[PageRank=20.493] is used as a change address during 
the WannaCry campaign on 4th August 2017 and 
subsequently linked to the largest page ranked node 
which is a transaction, 
29779df2e2a5a1f823b22e7e974a0082bdfd389edc1c11
d1d4f6b290d8118d27 [PageRank=40.4775] occurring 
on 31st August 2017 having over 230 inputs with an 
output connected to an address 
(1ETWkyQUY9nRpVMyGwha4vRhwKgMbomMQe) 
controlled by exchange HitBTC.com. Despite these 
intricate connections these nodes only yield a risk score 
of 0.987784659211026 and 0.964703062973474 
respectively and are positioned well outside the top 20 
risky nodes identified in table 1. Therefore, in this 
instance, little correlation can be derived between the 
risk score and page rank. However, using the 
combination of risk score on individual nodes and 
community detection it is possible to augment decision 
intelligence on what areas of the graph to monitor and 
investigate. This is illustrated in Figure 5. 
Figure 5 - Graph representation of the WannaCry Ransomware seed address 




Community detection is another common fraud 
detection technique used on networks to identify 
communities of nodes exhibiting anomalous behaviour 
that can be targeted for investigation [24]. Attributing a 
risk score to these communities on the aggregate we can 
determine which communities pose the greatest risk to 
the successful fulfilment of the network objectives. 
Table 2 demonstrates this.  
 
 
Table 2 - Median risk score grouped by community 




By using the median riskiness for the communities, 
it is possible to see how high the middle score is in the 
ordered set of risk scores for that community. The 
higher that middle score the higher the concentration of 
risky nodes to go after. This can be further validated via 
the graph visualisation in figure 5. The nodes 
highlighted by the red circles indicate the top 20 risky 
nodes from table 1 and the groups of nodes encircled by 




It can be seen from table 2 and figure 5 that 
communities two and three share the highest community 
risk scores. Community three contains four of the top 20 
risky nodes and visually plays a very central role in the 
facilitation of cashing out the proceeds of the WannaCry 
ransom. Node number 7 is a transaction within 
community three, 
340b44c7a7857e36f81b2e8ba713911ea93e82afde6ea5
590df1a35688845d16, that handles 8.715 BTC of the 
collected ransom and routes 6.877 BTC through 
community three on 3rd August 2017 and a further 
1.8376 BTC splits off into community two. Community 
three acts as a mixing community to obfuscate this 
portion of the ransom with the transaction at node 18 
(131551e35e7a644b76ea5366f744313bff3f959207c41
6f7b7b7f9b1cc90b0a3) combining the ransom cash-out 
with four other inputs to produce an output of 32 BTC 
on the 4th August 2018 to HitBTC.com owned address 
1ETWkyQUY9nRpVMyGwha4vRhwKgMbomMQe. 
A considerable sized transaction heading to an exchange 
that would certainly raise suspicion. An interesting 
observation on community two is that even though it has 
a high community risk score it only contains one of the 
top 20 risky nodes, a transaction 
1b2a3333f583ae54dba78ccc71f4fe24a22acd0991d364
e75bcf099ce3a84759, ranked 17th in table 1, occurring 
on 3rd August 2017 which facilitates 1.8376 BTC of the 
cash-out for the WannaCry ransom via one input 
address and two output addresses. This is where the 
combination of the risk score and community detection 
provides further targeted analysis. If we were only to go 
on the list of risky nodes in table 1 the investigator could 
spend their time looking at community four where 11 of 
the nodes reside. However, examining the collective 
reveals the median riskiness of that community is only 
0.66 (see table 2). Community four is also the largest 
community by membership and the relevance of the risk 
score dispels the myth that a more populated community 
would produce a higher concentration of risky nodes. 
5.6. Targeted disruption 
 
Now that there is a way of identifying risky nodes in 
the ransomware-Bitcoin network, intervention can be 
considered to target these nodes and disrupt or eliminate 
them. Looking at figure 6 which is a replication of figure 
5 with one of the risky nodes, transaction 
131551e35e7a644b76ea5366f744313bff3f959207c416
f7b7b7f9b1cc90b0a3, node 18, removed. 
 
 
Figure 6 - Graph representation of the WannaCry 




out network, disrupting node 18 
 
At first glance this looks like a good tactic, severing 
the transaction at node 18 will inhibit the ability of the 
attackers to continue cashing out their proceeds of 
crime. However, the practical implications of doing this 
are not so simple. Node 18 represents a transaction with 
ID 
131551e35e7a644b76ea5366f744313bff3f959207c416
f7b7b7f9b1cc90b0a3, the details of this transaction can 
be seen in figure 7. If it were possible to disrupt this 
transaction, there would be significant impact to the 
attackers fulfilling their objectives. Tracing the amount 
from the ransomware seed address, this transaction 
receives 5.1309 BTC of the ransom from address 
1HQiNjBRrHZpuyaWYXnCMhwcvJPqF5e97M. This 
amount is combined with inputs from four other 
addresses to send a total of 32.02476446 BTC to address 
1ETWkyQUY9nRpVMyGwha4vRhwKgMbomMQe 
which belongs to exchange HitBtc.com. 
 
 
It would take significant effort, knowledge and real 
time action to be able to disrupt this transaction. This 
would have to be done in near real time by corrupting 
the transaction script by hacking at the Bitcoin software 
as was the case when Mt Gox destroyed 2,609 BTC  
[25]. Alternatively, fictitious addresses can be 
simultaneously generated with their public and private 
keys, at the time of the transaction, to receive payments 
and sign the Bitcoin over to the next owner in the chain 
and divert the ransom funds away from being exchanged 
at HitBtc.com [26]. 
 
6. Limitations  
 
The concept of the similarity analysis and the 
application to a ransomware-Bitcoin cash out network 
was only applied to one of the WannaCry 2.0 
ransomware seed addresses 
(12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMw). The 
analysis system is highly dependent on the quality of 
graph embeddings produced by the DeepWalk 
algorithm. Whilst preserving the structure of the nodes 
of the graph in relation to each other, the embedding 
algorithm used in this analysis was still only in 
development and not released in the Neo4j (graph 
database) production library for graph data science. 
Therefore, at this stage, validating the quality of the 
embeddings is difficult. In addition, using the output of 
the DeepWalk algorithm as input features to the cosine 
similarity score, the risk rating or recommendation on 
which nodes to attack in the network for intervention in 
illicit money flows has a dependency on knowing the 
ransomware seed address. Nevertheless, the system can 
still be used to initiate responses based on the ‘riskiness’ 
score obtained from the cosine similarity calculation and 
auto classify existing and new nodes coming into the 
network. To be effective in this manner the operation 
would need to be done in near or real-time. For example, 
we see the cash-out activity for the 
12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMw 
ransomware seed address during the WannaCry 
campaign all happen within the space of six hours. The 





8d3e78a8d365b9d8a7), began at 03/08/2017 04:28:20 
UTC. The transaction 
Figure 7 - Transaction details for transaction ID: 






97e56a68c241004c28) that facilitated a cash out at the 
exchange Poloniex.com occurred at 03/08/2017 
10:04:51 UTC.    
7. Future Research  
 
Considering the most targeted pieces of information 
revealed from the similarity analysis are the identity of 
the address node and its risk score. There remain gaps 
in the available identity information from the raw data. 
Nonetheless, several features could be used in further 
machine learning techniques to predict the nature of 
nodes. A prediction algorithm could be built that would 
identify, for example, probable exchange services or 
other types of categories such as whether a node is 
involved in ransomware or not. This would allow 
analysts and investigators to estimate the location and 
ultimate owner of the address in the Bitcoin network 
removing significant barriers to the anonymity afforded 
to nefarious actors using cryptocurrencies. This would 
be an enormous improvement given the magnitude of 
the gap in the raw data. For example, in the data on the 
cash-out graph for WannaCry ransom seed address 
12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMw only 3 
out of the 280 addresses are labelled with exchange 
services (approx. 1%). Table 3 highlights Poloniex.com 
and HitBtc.com as the most prominent exchange used 
when cashing out the ransomware proceeds. 
 
 
Table 3 - Available labels on the 
12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMw 
WannaCry ransom seed address 
 
Building a prediction engine at scale to assist 
attribution of anomalous nodes in the network is outside 
the scope of this research paper. However, the data 
collected from the analysis system paves the way for 
future research in this area. As an example, 
cryptocurrency forensic analysis firm Elliptic and 
researchers at IBM and Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) have released a public data set of 
around 200,000 transactions partially labelled with 
illicit or non-illicit flags to identify suspicious 
transactions on the blockchain within the context of 
Anti-money Laundering (AML) [27]. 
Understanding a graph in the past helps create a 
baseline for what to look for in the future. In order to 
understand how a current scenario relates to that 
baseline it is important to know what has changed and 
what hasn’t. This helps detect any anomalies, or unusual 
patterns, within the dynamic nature of a Bitcoin 
blockchain graph. More sophisticated algorithms such 
as, Microcluster-Based Detector of Anomalies in Edge 
Streams (MIDAS), are able to detect dynamic 
behaviours in graphs [28]. This lends itself well to the 
Bitcoin - blockchain environment as the graphs formed 
here are constantly being updated with new addresses 
and transactions. In addition, when it comes to 
discovering ransomware graphs in such an environment 
micro cluster detection helps detect sudden bursts of 
activity on nodes or edges, which are common to the 
behaviours of both the cash in and cash out graphs in 




This research paper draws insights into using 
machine learning techniques combined with human 
interpretation to identify nefarious nodes in the 
WannaCry ransomware-Bitcoin cash-out network. The 
focus of this paper has been on using the Cosine 
Similarity calculation on DeepWalk embeddings to 
define a risk index that identifies what nodes, if 
eliminated from the network, carry the greatest risk to 
the attacker achieving their objectives, i.e. cashing out 
collected ransom payments. Using the Cosine Similarity 
as a risk index on an individual basis may not yield a 
targeted disruption of the network objectives. However, 
when the risk index was taken in combination with 
community detection a more powerful analysis emerged 
to isolate risky sections of the network. In particular, the 
practices of graph embedding and principal component 
analysis provide a truly reusable set of features for 
future machine learning applications. Furthermore, 
finding mechanisms to estimate the identities of nodes 
on the network will help attribute nodes with a particular 
Bitcoin service. However, limitations are evident with 
these techniques having only used a data set relating to 
the WannaCry ransomware-Bitcoin cash-out network. 
One broader benefit to the research community would 
be to open source multiple ransomware-Bitcoin network 
data sets for validation of analysis techniques.  
Significantly, the entire approach remains 
predicated on identifying the ransomware seed address 
to build the target network.  
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